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Abstract 
 
Purpose – This paper maps out multi-agency partnerships in the UK information 
assurance (UKIA) network in the UK.  
Design/methodology/approach – The paper surveyed members of the UKIA 
community and achieved a 52 percent response rate (n=104). The paper used a multi-
dimensional scaling (MDS) technique to map the multi-agency cooperation space and 
factor analysis and ordinary least squares regression to identify predictive factors of 
cooperation frequency. Qualitative data were also solicited via the survey and interviews 
with security managers.  
Findings – Via the quantitative measures, the paper locates gaps in the multi-agency 
cooperation network and identifies predictors of cooperation. The data indicate an over-
crowded cybersecurity space, problems in apprehending perpetrators, and poor business 
case justifications for SMEs as potential inhibitors to cooperation, while concern over 
certain cybercrimes and perceptions of organisational effectiveness were identified as 
motivators.  
Practical implications – The data suggest that the neo-liberal rationality that has been 
evoked in other areas of crime control is also evident in the control of cybercrimes. The 
paper concludes divisions exist between the High Policing rhetoric of the UK’s Cyber 
Security Strategy and the (relatively) Low Policing cooperation outcomes in “on the 
ground” cyber-policing. If the cooperation outcomes advocated by the UK Cyber 
Security Strategy are to be realised, UKIA organisations must begin to acknowledge and 
remedy gaps and barriers in cooperation.  
Originality/value – This paper provides the first mixed-methods evidence on the 
multi-agency cooperation patterns amongst the UKIA community in the UK and 
highlights significant gaps in the network.  
 
Keywords – Cooperation, Information sharing, Partnership, Cybercrime, Cybersecurity 
networks Paper type Research paper  
 
Introduction 
Activity conducted through the Internet and other networked digital systems represents 
an increasingly important front for national and international security and crime-
fighting. One of the most problematic issues in cyber security is the lack of cooperation 
and coordination amongst organisations to monitor, detect and react to attacks. 
Although various software tools (anti-virus, malware and intrusion detection systems) 
and standards (e.g. ISO 27000 series on security risk assessment) exist, the most recent 
Information Security Breaches Survey (PwC 2013) identified that 93% of large business 
and 87% of SME respondents had a security incident in the last year, with the average 
cost of the worst incident ranging from £450k-£850k for large businesses and £35k-
£65k for SMEs.  Vendor statistics show an increase on 2011 in new unique malicious 
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web domains, targeted attacks, mobile vulerabilites, Bot zombies, and virus and phishing 
attempts (via email) (Symantec 2013).  Academic research shows high public concern 
about identity theft and public-facing consumer cybercrime in a variety of countries, 
most notably the UK (see Levi and Williams 2012, Williams and Levi 2013).  Given time 
lags in crime reporting and cross-border victim-offender distanciation, full enforcement 
of crimes reactively reported is impossible, even if it were desirable to spend taxpayer 
resources in that way.  The likely impacts of intelligence led policing strategies depend 
on the organisation of criminal markets and on their susceptibility to different 
interventions:  but unless the markets are highly concentrated and accessible to police 
with a competence and motivation to act against them, then such criminal justice 
approaches will also have limited effects.  In common with many areas of financial 
sector policing, data about cybercrimes sometimes comes from the public, but the 
majority of the data is held in private commercial hands, and often, it is the private 
sector that has a primary role and interest in defending their businesses from cyber-
assisted crimes.  More recently cooperation has arisen as the preferred form of defence, 
facilitating the sharing of cybercrime information between private and criminal justice 
actors (Cabinet Office 2011).  However, there currently exists little evidence on the 
organisation of these various actors in the ‘cybercrime reduction network space’.  On 
the basis of a study carried out in 2011 and 2012, this paper primarily reports and 
analyses data on the public-private, public-public and private-private policing interfaces 
in the policing of cybercrimes in the UK, and explores the implications both for the 
literature on the new security governance and for the regulation of cyber-related harms.  
Based on a survey of 104 members of the UK Information Assurance community this 
paper reports on the location of gaps in the network and identifies predictors of 
cooperation via multi-dimensional scaling and regression techniques.  In addition, 
qualitative data indicate an over-crowded cybersecurity space, problems in apprehending 
perpetrators, and poor business case justifications for SMEs were potential inhibitors to 
cooperation; while concern over certain cybercrimes and perceptions of organisational 
effectiveness were potential motivators to cooperation. Our data suggest that the neo-
liberal rationality that has been evoked in other areas of crime control is also evident in 
the control of cybercrimes.  We conclude divisions exist between the High Policing 
rhetoric of the UK’s Cyber Security Strategy and the (relatively) Low Policing 
cooperation outcomes in ‘on the ground’ cyber-policing. 
Partnerships in Cybercrime Reduction 
There exists a significant body of academic work on the emergence and maturation of 
the ‘preventive turn’ and community safety in late-modern times (see Crawford 1997; 
Garland 2001; Gilling 2007; Hughes 2007; Hughes and Edwards 2009).  The Crime and 
Disorder Act (1998) formalised partnership arrangements and began ‘a long overdue 
recognition that the levers and causes of crime lie far from the traditional reach of the 
criminal justice system… drawing together a variety of organisations and stakeholders, 
in the public, voluntary and private sectors as well as from among relevant community 
groups’ (Crawford 2002: 31).  The recognition of the limits of policing and of other 
state agencies promotes governing strategies that rely on ‘responsibilising’ private actors 
and civil society to govern their own spaces in crime and disorder reduction efforts 
(Garland 2001).  A certain neo-liberal rationality has been evoked where state 
intervention is rolled back as private actors adopt individualized, responsibilised and 
practical roles in community networked governance (Edwards and Hughes 2009; 
Johnston and Shearing 2003).  Where the old paradigm of criminal justice marshalled 
police-based expertise, the new networks of security mobilise diverse resources, placing 
importance upon specialist knowledge and capacity (Johnston and Shearing 2003).  This 
interpretation is specifically applicable to the domain of cybercrime and cyber-security – 
the technical challenge posed by cybercrime cannot be met by the police alone and the 
expertise required must be brought in from outside the police service. This has always 
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been the case in dealing with frauds of different types (Williams 2006; Doig and Levi 
2009; Levi 2010). 
 
Many areas of the policing crime diet have been addressed by the application of multi-
agency crime reduction partnerships.  It has been argued by many authors that 
cybercrime is the ideal candidate for such arrangements (Williams 2006; Wall 2007; 
2011; Sulek 2011; Irion 2012; Levi and Williams 2012; Williams and Levi 2012).  In 
particular, the theoretical constructs of plural policing and nodal governance have been 
applied to understand the arrangements and practices of networks of actors in the 
information assurance domain (Dupont 2004; Wall 2007; Wall and Williams 2007; Nhan 
and Huey 2008; Huey et al. 2012).  The main thrust of these positions is that late-
modern forms of policing are characterised by a diffusion of responsibilities related to 
the governance of cybercrime to actors that have traditionally not had an official or non-
official regulatory mandate.  The ‘networked and nodal architecture’ of the internet 
inherently makes it a prime candidate for a partnership approach to regulation and 
governance (Wall 2007).  Nhan and Huey (2008) categorise ‘nodal clusters’ that form 
the cybercrime reduction network: government (including international and national 
criminal justice, non-criminal justice and local); law enforcement (from international to the 
local); private industry (across all sectors, large, medium, small and micro) and the general 
public (civil society groupings both on and offline)i.  Dupont delineates five forms of 
capital that shape nodal networks.  Nodes with high degrees of social capital can foster 
and sustain mutually beneficial social relations with other nodes.  Cultural capital relates 
to knowledge possessed by a node that can be used and offered up to other nodes for 
cybersecurity.  Nodes with political capital have a strong theoretical and/or working 
knowledge of local, national and international political structures and may have the 
power to shape legislation and marshal public resources.  Economic capital relates to 
knowledge of international markets as they relate to cybersecurity and beyond and the 
purchasing power of a node.  Symbolic capital is the final overarching and linking form 
that underpins all others – a less manifest form of capital that affords organisational 
legitimacy.  Access to these forms of capital vary by node and an efficient and resilient 
cybersecurity network must be in a position to assemble sufficient degrees of each 
though its nodes.  Therefore, collaboration and partnership in the arena of cybercrime 
reduction is becoming commonplace as actors within nodes recognise the limitations of 
the Peelian paradigm of policing that frames the police–public mandate (Wall and 
Williams 2007).   
There exist several high-profile multi-agency cybercrime reduction partnerships.  Wall 
(2007) highlights several international partnerships, including POLCYB (Society for the 
Policing of Cyberspace) and the High Tech Crime Consortium (HTCC).  POLCYB is a 
multi-agency, cross-sectoral partnership that facilitates cooperation between members 
and the sharing of information on cybersecurity risks and issues that relate to policy.  
HTCC is an Internet based closed forum for law enforcement and security professionals 
that is more operational in orientation.  The Virtual Global Task Force represents an 
international partnership between law enforcement, non-government organisations and 
industry groups with the aim of protecting children online.  In the United States (US) 
public-private partnerships exist between the government and several commercial nodes 
including ISPs (the Defense Industrial Base) and the Industry Botnet Group (Butler and 
Lachow 2012).   US and European Union partnerships include the Working Group on 
Cybersecurity, and within Europe, the Public-Private Partnership for Resilience 
programme (EP3R) has a mandate to foster cooperation between public and private 
stakeholders to strengthen resilience in relation to pan-European critical infrastructure 
(Irion 2012).   
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In the UK several nodes form the complex network of cybersecurity.  The Information 
Assurance Collaboration Group’s (IACG)ii UK Information Assurance (UKIA) map 
2012 (issue 4.0) delineates this network into eight clusters: Regulatory Bodies (OFCOM, 
ICO etc.); International Forums (ENISAiii, ISSFiv etc.); Government/Industry Groups 
(EURIMv, Get Safe Online etc.), Professional Bodies (The Law Society, BCSvi etc.); 
Government (criminal justice related - Home Office, GCHQ, and non criminal justice 
related - Cabinet Office, HMRC etc.); Trade Associations & Industry Groups (IT 
Security Forum, Nominet etc.); Academic and Research Bodies, and Other (e.g. 
Liberty).  In addition IT, finance and other large, medium, small and micro commercial 
organisations, can be said to form a private cluster.  In relation to illegal online content, 
collaborative arrangements exist between the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the 
Child Exploitation Online Protection Centre (CEOP) and the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency (SOCA).  In the area of fraud, cooperative arrangements exist between Action 
Fraud, the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), SOCA, the Serious Fraud Office 
(SFO), Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the National Police Central 
cybercrime Unit (PCeU).  Cooperation with private nodes within these partnerships is 
ad hoc and largely informal.  To address this deficit the UK Cyber Security Strategy 
(Cabinet Office 2011) promoted public-private partnership working amongst the 
various nodes and outlined the piloting of partnership ‘hubs’ in defence, finance, 
telecommunications, pharmaceutical and energy sectors.   A year on from the 
publication of the Cyber Security Strategy, the Cabinet Office (2012) announced the 
creation of a dedicated UK national Computer Emergency Response Team (UK CERT) 
to improve the national coordination of cyber incidents and to act as a focal point for 
international sharing of technical information on cyber security.  In addition, a 
permanent information sharing environment – the Cyber Security Information Sharing 
Partnership (CISP) – was announced.  The formation of the National Cybercrime Unit 
(NCCU) as an integral part of the National Crime Agency promises to further integrate 
commercial voices into the regulatory sphere by dedicating a ‘pillar’ of its remit to 
building and sustaining public-private partnerships (Home Office 2010).  
 
The effectiveness of these partnerships in achieving their objectives is difficult to 
determine (Wall 2007).  Some authors argue that partnership working, especially 
between public and private partners, can be ‘an unreliable and unpredictable 
solution…in the areas of national emergency preparedness and crisis management’ 
(Andersson and Malm 2006: 140).  Reasons for this include that the interests of private 
corporations and the state are often not easily reconcilable, resulting in a lack of a clear 
business case for industry (especially for SMEs and in times or austerity); a lack of trust 
between parties, including tensions between hierarchical reporting and horizontal 
information sharing; failures to effectively and fully engage with civil society and the 
various ‘publics’ (both on and offline); and the existing limitations of national and 
international cooperation arrangements (Dunn-Cavelty and Suter 2009; Huey et al. 2012; 
Sulek & Doscher 2011; Wall 2007).  Contrariwise, where partnerships between the 
police and private industry are successful, concerns have been expressed over the 
‘transformation’ thesis (Jones and Newburn 2002), that contends as the ratio of private 
actors to police actors increases in any given policing system, the overall orientation of 
the system shifts from the logic of the public good to the logic of the market.  However, 
White and Gill have shown that this is short-sighted, and that existing partnerships in 
the UK have seen a ‘complex blurring of relations and rationalities, with both private 
and police actors drawing upon a mix of public and private scripts to inform their 
actions’ (2013: 74).  These concerns remind us of Crawford’s (2002) recognition that the 
pluralisation of security and safety has created sites of contradiction, ambiguity and 
ambivalence.  Edwards and Hughes’ (2009) research into partnership working in 
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England and Wales has them concluding like Crawford that the field is marked by 
contradictory and unstable forces.  In particular, they note there are often schisms 
between security talk, decisions and actions resulting in gaps between intended 
governmental projects and their actual outcomes.  We now turn to our hypotheses that 
draw upon this conceptual and empirical work, which we then return to in the 
discussion to make sense of our findings. 
Hypotheses 
H1: Intra-sector cooperation around cybercrime reduction will be evident in the 
multi-dimensional scaling, but inter-sector cooperation will not.   
This assumption is based on the nascence of inter-sector cooperation initiatives 
developed in the recent Cyber Security Strategy (Cabinet Office 2011) and previous 
research that demonstrates the tensions evident in inter-sector security partnerships 
and the negative impact these have on open cooperation channels, especially 
between public and private nodes (Dunn-Cavelty and Suter 2009; Huey et al. 2012; 
Sulek & Doscher 2011; Wall 2007). 
H2: Perceptions about cybercrimes, both in terms of the seriousness of the problems 
and the difficulty of their control, will be significantly associated with levels of 
cooperation.  In particular, (i) perceptions that cybercrimes are a serious problem will 
be positively associated with cooperation; and (ii) perceptions that cybercrimes are 
difficult to control will be positively associated with cooperation.   
These assumptions are based on the partnership literature that suggests networks of 
security arrange around significant and complex crime problems (Crawford 1997; 
Garland 2001; Hughes 2007).  In relation to (i) we assume those who perceive that 
cybercrimes are more of a serious problem will seek out cooperation with nodes, 
especially those who have expertise in a given area.  In relation to (ii) we assume 
perceptions that cybercrimes are difficult to control will promote a cooperative 
approach given that cooperative arrangements in crime reduction are associated with 
complex social problems and hard-to-control crimes. 
H3: Perceptions of the effectiveness and importance of nodes will be associated with 
levels of cooperation.  In particular (i) perceptions that private, government and non-
government nodes are effective in combating cybercrime will be positively associated 
with frequency of cooperation with these respective nodes; (ii) perceptions that 
private, government and non-government nodes are important in the cybersecurity 
network will be positively associated with frequency of cooperation with these 
respective nodes.   
These assumptions are based on research that shows nodes will seek to cooperate 
with other nodes who demonstrate they can assemble certain forms of network 
capital to achieve effective outcomes, which increases their importance in 
cybersecurity networks (Nhan and Huey 2008; Huey et al. 2012; Dupont 2004).   
As is recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) the three alternative hypotheses 
above were transformed into null hypotheses (H0), each indicating the absence of the 
specified associations.  Evidence in the regression models detailed in the results section 
of the paper lend support for our alternative hypotheses, allowing us to reject the null 
hypotheses.   
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Data & Methods 
Data  
Currently no accessible sources of data exist on the frequency of cooperation in the 
multi-agency partnership cybercrime reduction network (the UKIA network).  The data 
used in this paper were collected as part of the Nominet funded project ‘Mapping 
Cybercrime and its Control’.  This study aimed to map the cooperation space in the 
UKIA network to identify gaps in collaboration and opportunities for the development 
of a formal partnership approach.  The population of interest was the UKIA network 
which includes members from the public, private and voluntary sectors.  The 
Information Assurance Collaboration Group’s (IACG) UKIA map 2011 (issue 3.1) was 
used to draw a samplevii and all listed organisations (approximately 200) were invited to 
participate in the study.  A mixed methods approach was adopted, including an online 
survey instrumentviii and online and offline interviews with node representativesix.    As 
the respondents were self-selecting we were not able to establish a randomised 
probability survey sample.  Dorofeev & Grant (2006) state that studies that are 
concerned more with interrelationships between variables and less with hard measures 
of prevalence are likely to suffer less from the use of nonprobability sampling.  The 
results reported later in this paper relate to inter-relations between variables and not 
measures of prevalence.  Moreover, our study is principally concerned with 'soft' 
measures (perceptions), which have no absolute validity (they cannot be compared with 
any authoritative external measure).  To mitigate sampling bias, a potential drawback of 
self-selecting sampling techniques (Tabachnick and Fidell 2013), we selectively targeted 
the various sectors within the UKIA network to achieve a balanced representation.  
Overall we achieved a 52 percent response rate with good coverage within all sectors. 
Methods 
Multi-Dimensional Scaling Procedure 
The online survey included several questions that invited respondents to detail 
cooperation frequency with other nodes in the UKIA network.  Multi-dimensional 
scaling (MDS) was used to make sense of this data.  MDS models take sets of 
quantitative proximity data (distances and similarities between objects) and represent 
them visually by a set of points in a space.  These points are plotted in such a way that 
geometrical relationships such as distance between the points reflect the empirical 
relationships in the data.  The resulting picture of the data is much more simple to 
interpret than the matrix of quantitative measures it represents (Coxon 1982).  The most 
widely understood example of MDS is based on literal geographic proximities (Kruskal 
and Wish 1978).  A dataset consisting of distances in miles between pairs of cities in the 
US can be visually plotted in two dimensions (See Figure 1).  Small and large distances 
between points in the visualisation relate to the small and large distances in miles 
between cities in the dataset.  Furthermore, the two dimensions produced by the MDS 
procedure relate to North-South and West-East geography in real space.  In 
criminology, MDS and its derivatives (e.g. Smallest Space Analysis) have been used 
widely in the fields of offender profiling and crime scene analysis (see Salfati 2000; 
Santtila 2003).  The key difference between studies like these and the example used 
above is that social science measures of ‘distance’ between the objects of study are often 
less manifest than miles.  Typically social science distance data are non-metric (such as 
ordinal data) and can relate to perceptions of similarities or dissimilarities between objects.  
Resulting MDS visualisations of these kinds of data are often more difficult to interpret 
compared to the above example, as researchers are left to infer the nature of dimensions 
that are calculated on more abstract measures (e.g. perceptions of distance).  
Furthermore, more than two dimensions are also possible in a MDS solution, further 
complicating interpretation (although two dimensional solutions are most common).  
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Despite these complexities, MDS affords researchers with an intuitive visual way of 
interpreting empirical relationships in data that may otherwise remain in obscurity.  
However, its use in criminological research beyond psychological disciplines is limited, 
and there is no reference in the literature made to MDS being used to analyse the 
cooperation space in multi-agency partnerships in crime reduction.  Outside of 
criminology Naurin and Lindahl (2007) used the procedure to successfully map the 
cooperation patterns in the working groups of the council of the European Union using 
frequency of contact scores.  In this study we adopted a similar method by asking 
responding UKIA nodes to score their frequency of cooperation with other UKIA 
nodes on an ordinal scale of 1 (no cooperation) to 4 (a lot of cooperation).  These nodes 
fell into 12 clusters (see dependent measures for a description).  We then used the 
PROXSCAL (PROXimity SCALing) procedure in SPSS to map the frequency of 
cooperation between these types of nodes, where frequencies were converted into 
measures of distance between points in a plot.  Points that are close in proximity reflect 
high frequency of cooperation, where points that are distant reflect low frequency of 
cooperation.  The dimensions on the plot represent underlying features of the 
cooperation space between clusters in the multi-agency partnerships (see results section 
for our interpretation of these dimensions). 
Figure 1: Multidimensional scaling model of flying distances between US cities 
Factor Analysis Procedure 
MDS enabled the empirically informed visualization of the UKIA cooperation space, 
but it said little about the organizational characteristics that are associated with high or 
low cooperation levels.  For this regression models were used (see description below).  
As a precursor to building predictive regression models of cooperation, dependent 
measures of frequency were derived via the factor analysis procedure principal 
components analysis (PCA).  This procedure reduces a large set of variables to a smaller 
set of components that have an underlying commonality.  These components are 
derived by calculating inter-correlations and grouping together variables that are highly 
correlated.  The same 12 cluster variables that were entered into the MDS were 
subjected to PCA and the resulting three components, which we term meta-clusters, were 
entered into the OLS regression models as composite dependent measures of 
cooperation frequency (see dependent variables and factor analysis results section for a 
description of extracted components). 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
The three components, or meta-clusters, extracted from the PCA were included in three 
separate OLS regression models as dependent measures.  Given the relative small 
sample size and the violation of the normality assumption of OLS regression the bias 
with any authoritative external measure). To mitigate sampling bias, a potential
drawback of self-selecting sampling techniques (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013), we
selectively targeted the various sectors within the UKIA network to achieve a balanced
representation. Overall, we achieved a 52 percent response rate with good coverage
within all sectors.
Methods
MDS procedure. The online survey included several questions that invited respondents
to detail cooperation frequency with other nodes in the UKIA network. MDS was used to
make sense of this data. MDS models take sets of quantitative proximity data (distances
and similarities between objects) and represent them visually by a set of points in a
space. These points are plotted in such a way that geometrical relationships such as
distance between the points reflect the empirical relationships in the data. The resulting
picture of the data is much more simple to interpret than the matrix of quantitative
measures it represents (Coxon, 1982). The most widely understood example of MDS is
based on literal geographic proximities (Kruskal andWish, 1978). A dataset consisting of
distances in miles between pairs of cities in the USA can be visually plotted in two
dimensions (Figure 1). Small and large distances between points in the visualisa ion
relate to the small and large distances in miles between cities in the dataset. Furthermore,
the two dimensions produced by the MDS procedure relate to North-South and
West-East geography in real space. In criminology,MDS and its derivatives (e.g. smallest
space analysis) have been used widely in the fields of offender profiling and crime scene
analysis (Salfati, 2000; Santtila et al., 2003). The key difference between studies like these
and the example us d above is that social science mea ures of “distanc ” between the
objects of study are often less manifest than miles. Typically social science distance data
are non-metric (such as ordinal data) and can relate to perceptions of similarities or
dissimilarities between objects. Resulting MDS visualisations of these kinds of data are
often more difficult to interpret compared to the above example, as researchers are left to
infer the n ture f dimensions that are calculated on more abstract measures
(e.g. perceptions of distance). Furthermore, more than two dimensions are also possible
Figure 1.
Multidimensional scaling
model of flying distances
between ten US cities
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corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapping technique was used.  Bootstrapping is a 
nonparametric resampling procedure used to empirically estimate the sampling 
distribution of the indirect effect, thus reducing problems with type I errors and low 
statistical power endemic to analyses that rely on assumptions of sampling distribution 
normality (Efron and Tibshirani 1993).   Results from correlational analyses (not 
shown), and tolerance statistics and variance inflation factors showed there were no 
problems with multicollinearity among the predictor variables.  Statistics indicated a 
robust fit to the data in all three modelsx. 
 
Dependent Variables  & Factor Analys is  Resul ts  
Online survey items measured the frequency of cooperation amongst respondents from 
within the UKIA network.  Respondents were asked to indicate their level of 
cooperation with 12 types of clusters on a four point likert scale (‘no cooperation’ 
through to ‘a lot of cooperation’).  The list of clusters included: Government Criminal 
Justice related; Government non-Criminal Justice related; Local Government; Private-
IT; Private-Financial; Private-Other; Professional Bodies; Industry Groups; Academic 
Organisations; Regulatory Bodies; Charities/Not-for-Profit Organisations; and Police.  
PCA with orthogonal rotation (varimax) was used as a data reduction method to identify 
the underlying components of the 12 clusters (inter-correlations of a set of variables).  
The correlation matrix of the 12 clusters revealed the presence of numerous correlation 
coefficients at .3 and above xi .  For example, cooperation with the government 
departments – criminal justice cluster and cooperation with government departments – 
non-criminal justice cluster, were strongly correlated (r = .83).  Similarly, cooperation 
with the Police cluster and cooperation with the Private Finance cluster, were also 
strongly correlated (r = .69).  Conversely, cooperation with the charities cluster and 
cooperation with private sector finance cluster, were poorly correlated (r = .31).  The 
matrix therefore provided evidence that the 12 cooperation clusters were reducible to 
two or more componentsxii.   Based on an inspection of the eigenvalues, screeplot and 
rotated factor loadings three components were extracted.  Table I details the rotated 
component loadings for the 12 clusters.  The three component solution explained 81.12 
percent of the variance, with component one contributing 65.65 percent, component 
two 9.19 percent and component three 6.27 percent.   Not surprisingly the rotated 
solution revealed the presence of a structure similar to the MDS solution (see MDS 
results), albeit with an additional component/dimension.  Each component showed a 
number of high loadings, with the majority of variables loading substantially on only one 
component.  Items that are loaded heavily on component one were strongly associated 
with cooperation with a ‘front line’ meta-cluster (private sector finance, IT and other and 
cooperation with 12 types of clusters on a four point Likert scale (“no cooperation”
through to “a lot of cooperation”). The list of clusters included: government criminal
justice related; government non-criminal justice related; local government; private-IT;
private-financial; private-other; professional bodies; industry groups; a ic
organisations; regulat ry bodies; charities/not-f r-profit organisations; and police. PCA
with orthogonal rotation (varimax) was used as a data reduction method to identify the
underlying components of the 12 clusters (inter-correlations of a set of variables).
The correlation matrix of the 12 clusters revealed the presence of numerous
correlation coefficients at 0.3 and above[10]. For example, cooperation with the
government departments – criminal justice cluster and cooperation with government
departments – non-criminal justice cluster, were strongly correlat d (r ¼ 0.83).
Similarly, cooperation with the police luster and cooperation w th the private finance
cluster, were also strongly correlated (r ¼ 0.69). Conversely, cooperation with the
charities cluster and cooperation with private sector finance cluster, were poorly
correlated (r ¼ 0.31). The matrix therefore provided evidence that the 12 cooperation
clusters were reducible to two or more components[11]. Based on an inspection of the
eigenvalues, screeplot and rotated factor loadings three components were extracted.
Table I details the rotated component loadings for the 12 clusters. The three component
solution explained 81.12 percent of the varian e, with component 1 contributing
65.65 percent, component 2 9.19 percent and c mponent 3 6.27 perc nt. Not
surprisingly the rotated solution revealed the presence of a structure similar to the
MDS solution (see MDS results), albeit with an additional component/dimension. Each
component showed a number of high loadings, with the majority of variables loading
substantially on only one component. Items that are loaded heavily on component 1
were strongly associated with cooperation with a “front line” meta-cluster (private
sector finance, IT and other and police) but have weak loadings (,0.4) with
components 2 and 3; items th t are loaded heavily o component 2 are trongly
associated with co peration with a “backst g non-c iminal justice” meta-cluster
Item
Rotated factor loadings
When tackling the cybercrime problem in the UK,
to what extent does your organisation cooperate with
any of the following? Component 1 Component 2 Component 3
Private sector – financial 0.874
Private sector – IT 0.861
Private sector – other 0.756
Police 0.637
Professional bodies 0.763
Industry groups 0.752
Academic/research bodies 0.676
Regulatory bodies 0.656
Charities/NfPs 0.641
Gov. depts – criminal justice 0.809
Gov. depts – non-criminal justice 0.796
Notes: x 2 (55) ¼ 1,043.59; p , 0.00; KMO measure of sampling adequacy (overall) ¼ 0.887; local
government were removed from the factor analysis due to poor loadings on each component (,0.300)
Source: Tabachnick and Fidell (2013)
Table I.
Factor loadings with
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
(KMO) measures of
sampling adequacy
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police) but have weak loadings (<.4) with components two and three; items that are 
loaded heavily on component two are strongly associated with cooperation with a 
‘backstage non-criminal justice’ meta-cluster (professional bodies, industry groups, 
academic organisations, regulatory bodies and charities) but have weak loadings with 
components one and three; finally items that are loaded heavily on component three are 
strongly associated with cooperation with a ‘backstage government’ meta-cluster 
(government-criminal justice related and government non-criminal justice related) but 
have weak loadings with components one and two.  Based on these distinct loadings we 
surmised there was a clear distinction between all three components.  We labelled 
component one as frequency of cooperation with the front-line meta-cluster, component two as 
frequency of cooperation with the backstage non-government meta-cluster, and component three as 
frequency of cooperation with the backstage government meta-cluster.  The component scores were 
extracted from the PCA and were used as continuous dependent variables in the 
regression analysis. 
Predic tor  Variables  
Perceptions of cybercrime – Two sets of items in the survey elicited perceptions data from 
respondents.   The first set of items elicited data on respondents’ perceptions of the 
severity of cybercrimes including malware attacks, denial of service attacks, hacking, 
insider unauthorised access and personal identity duplication/theft. The second set of 
items elected data on respondents’ perceptions of the ease of control of the various 
cybercrimes above.  Response options for both sets of items took the form of a four 
point likert scale (‘not at all a problem’ through to ‘a very serious problem’; ‘very easy to 
control’ through to ‘very difficult to control’).  Both sets of items were entered as 
ordinal predictor variables in the regression models. 
Perceptions of Clusters – Several items measured respondents’ perceptions of the 
effectiveness and importance of clusters in their fight against cybercrime in the UK.  On 
a likert scale of 1 (not at all effective/not at all important) to 4 (highly effective/very 
important) respondents were asked to rate their perceived effectiveness and importance 
of the 12 clusters.  It is likely that these perceptions emerge through cooperation 
experience with the clusters being judged, or through the communication of the 
experience of other nodes.  Reliability analysis was conducted on responses that 
indicated data reduction was possible via the development of scales for front line, back 
stage government and back stage non-government (directly mirroring the factor analysis 
reduction).  The perceived front line, back stage government and back stage non-
government effectiveness and importance scales were entered into the regression 
models as continuous predictor variablesxiii.   Tolerance statistics and variance inflation 
factors in the regression analyses reported later in the paper showed there were no 
issues with multicollinearity between these two sets of variables, indicating they were 
measuring independent constructs. 
Controls – Several variables were included in the models to control for internal 
organisational and personal respondent characteristics.  These include number of 
employees (categorised micro, small, medium and large organisations), age of node and 
personal length of tenure of the employee responding to the survey.   
Results 
Description of Survey Respondents 
A breakdown of survey respondents is provided in Table II.  UKIA members from the 
private sector formed the largest cluster of respondents (38 percent), made up of IT (16 
percent), ‘other’ (14 percent) and financial (9 percent) nodes.  Just under a third of 
responding UKIA members originated from non-government organisations, including 
Charities/Not-for-Profit (13 percent), academic/research (8 percent), and industry 
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Sample
Independent variables Coding n/M %/SD
Organisation type
Private sector – financial – 9 8.7
Private sector – IT – 16 15.5
Private sector – other – 14 13.6
Police – 11 10.7
Professional bodies – 4 3.9
Industry groups – 7 6.8
Academic/research bodies – 8 7.8
Regulatory bodies – 2 1.9
Charities/NfPs – 13 12.6
Gov. depts – criminal justice – 6 5.8
Gov. depts – non-criminal justice – 3 2.9
Public sector – other – 7 6.8
Local government – 3 2.9
Controls
No. of employees 1-9 21 20.4
10-49 7 6.8
50-249 25 24.3
250 or more 50 48.5
Age of org. ,1 year 3 2.9
1-5 years 17 16.3
6-10 years 9 8.7
11-15 years 12 11.5
16-20 years 8 7.7
.20 years 55 52.9
Personal length of tenure 0-5 years 19 18.3
6-11 years 36 34.6
12 years and above 49 47.2
Perceptions of cybercrime
Problem of malware attacks Scale range 1-4 3.25 0.76
Problem of DoS attacks Scale range 1-4 2.71 0.80
Problem of hacking Scale range 1-4 2.80 0.91
Problem of insider unauthorised access Scale range 1-4 2.95 0.99
Problem of personal ID theft Scale range 1-4 3.20 0.90
Control of malware attacks Scale range 1-4 2.83 0.85
Control of DoS attacks Scale range 1-4 2.96 0.75
Control of hacking Scale range 1-4 2.76 0.76
Control of insider unauthorised access Scale range 1-4 2.88 0.75
Control of personal ID theft Scale range 1-4 2.89 0.91
Perceptions of clusters
Front line effectiveness scale Scale range 4-16 10.24 2.10
Back stage gov. effectiveness scale Scale range 2-8 4.63 1.50
Back stage non-gov. effectiveness scale Scale range 5-18 10.59 2.94
Front line importance scale Scale range 8-16 14.42 1.70
Back stage gov. importance scale Scale range 4-8 7.21 1.02
Back stage non-gov. importance scale Scale range 7-20 15.61 2.78
Note: n ¼ 103
Table II.
Descriptive statistics
of UKIA organisations
IMCS
21,5
430
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nodes (7 percent) amongst others.  Government members made up one fifth of 
respondents, including government criminal justice related (6 percent), non-criminal 
justice related (3 percent), local (3 percent) and ‘other’ (7 percent).  Near fifty percent of 
respondents were deemed as ‘large’ nodes (>250 employees), with the remainder falling 
into the Small to Medium Sized Enterprise and Micro Enterprise categories.  The 
majority of responding nodes had been in existence for over 20 years, with just over a 
quarter reporting less than 10 years of incorporation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 11!
As a whole, the sample of UKIA nodes perceived malware attacks and personal identity 
theft as the most serious cybercrime problems facing the UK.  Perceived as least 
problematic were denial of service attacks (DoS).  Conversely, respondents perceived 
DoS attacks as most difficult to control, while perceiving hacking as most easy to 
control (see Williams & Levi 2012 for a sub-group analysis of these perceptions).  
Respondents perceived front line responses to cybercrime reduction as most effective, 
followed by back stage non-government and back stage government responses.  In 
relation to perceived importance, respondents rated front line and back stage 
government as equally important, followed by back stage non-government. 
MDS Results 
Figure 2 shows the PROXSCAL procedure produced a two dimensional MDS solution 
of the frequency of cooperation data provided by the UKIA network respondents.  The 
output also generated the stress value, which is a measure of the goodness of fit 
between the raw cooperation frequency data and the visualisation.  A test of statistical 
significance was applied to the stress value to determine if the match between the data 
and the visualization was statistically significant.  As is convention in the social sciences 
the threshold of significance for the stress value is .05.  The normalised raw stress value 
for the MDS solution reported here was .042, indicating the relationships among the 
clusters in the visualisation were statistically significant.  The Tucker’s φ coefficient of 
congruence equaled 0.98 and decompositions of normalized raw stress ranged from .02 
to .06.  Based on these measures we concluded the solution identified was robust and 
provided a good fit to the data.   
 
 
Interpreting the dimensions of non-metric MDS solutions is not a precise science as the 
underlying data may not relate to any externally valid hard measure (Kruskal and Wish 
1978).  In our case we asked respondents to rate their perceived level of cooperation on 
a four point Likert scale.  The resulting dimensions therefore represent some underlying 
features of the ‘perceived’ cooperation space.  An inspection of the plot does reveal 
variability in the distances between points that represent clusters.  Some are close in 
responding UKIA members originated from non-government organisations, including
charities/not-for-profit (13 percent), academic/research (8 percent), and industry nodes
(7 percent) amongst others. Government members made up one-fifth of respondents,
including government criminal justice related (6 percent), non-criminal justice related
(3 percent), local (3 percent) and “other” (7 percent). Near 50 percent of respondents
were deemed as “large” nodes (.250 employees), with the remainder falling into
the small to medium sized enterprise and micro enterprise categories. The majority of
responding nodes had been in existence for over 20 years, with just over a quarter
reporting less than ten years of incorporation.
As a whole, the sample of UKIA nodes perceived malware attacks and personal
identity theft as the most serious cybercrime problems facing the UK. Perceived as
least problematic were DoS. Conversely, respondents perceived DoS attacks as most
difficult to control, while perceiving hacking as most easy to control (see Williams
and Levi (2012) for a sub-group analysis of these perceptions). Respondents perceived
front line responses to cybercrime reduction as most effective, followed by back stage
non-government and back stage government responses. In relation to perceived
importance, respondents rated front line and back stage government as equally
important, followed by back stage non-government.
MDS results
Figure 2 shows the PROXSCAL procedure produced a two dimensional MDS solution
of the frequency of cooperation data provided by the UKIA network respondents. The
output also generated the stress value, which is a measure of the goodness of fit
between the raw cooperation frequency data and the visualisation. A test of statistical
significance was applied to the stress value to determine if the match between the data
Figure 2.
UKIA frequency of
cooperation space
Multi-agency
partnerships
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proximity, such as government criminal justice and police, while some are distant, such 
as local government and private sector – other.  An inspection of the original data 
matrix shows that in the former coupling both clusters scored their cooperation with 
each other as high (the mean score for government criminal justice cooperation with the 
police was 3.0 out of 4, while the mean score for police cooperation with government 
criminal justice was 2.1 out of 4), while in the latter coupling the clusters scored their 
cooperation with each other as low (the mean score for private sector – other 
cooperation with the local government was 0.1 out of 4, while the mean score for local 
government cooperation private – other was 0.3 out of 4).  This check further confirms 
the MDS visualisation accurately represents the underlying cooperation data.  We can 
therefore infer that the dimensions are a reflection of some underlying ‘nature’ of this 
cooperation space.  On the y axis, private clusters dominate the high end, while non-
private clusters dominate the lower end.  On the x axis, government clusters dominate 
the high end, while non government dominate the lower end.  We therefore inferred 
that the y dimension reflected non-private – private cooperation showing that private 
clusters tend to cooperate more frequency with each other than with non-private 
clusters, and vice versa.  The x axis reflected non-government – government 
cooperation, showing that government clusters tend to cooperate more with each other 
than with non-government clusters (with the exception of regulatory bodies) and vice 
versa.  Along these dimensions some clusters organise into dense cooperation ‘cliques’.  
The most apparent is at the rough intersection of the axes as indicated.  The regulatory 
bodies cluster takes centre stage in the cooperation space, in close proximity to private 
finance, government criminal justice, and police clusters.  This might be considered the 
inner-circle of cooperation.  Private sector IT, government non-criminal justice, industry 
groups and academic clusters occupy an outer circle that cooperates less frequently with 
the clusters within the inner circle and with each other.  On the periphery are private 
sector – other, charities, professional bodies and local government clusters – these have 
the lowest cooperation frequencies and are largely excluded from the inner cooperation 
spaces.   
 
Regression Models 
The sets of predictor variables (perceptions of cybercrime and perceptions of nodes) 
and controls were regressed onto the outcome variables derived from the PCA 
generating three models:  Model 1 – frequency of cooperation with the front-line meta-cluster; 
Model 2 – frequency of cooperation with the backstage non-government meta-cluster; and Model 3 – 
frequency of cooperation with the backstage government meta-cluster (see Table III).  
Perceptions of cybercrime – Holding all other factors constant several of the perceptions of 
cybercrimes variables emerged as having significant associations with frequency of 
cooperation in all three models.  In relation the front line meta-cluster (private 
companies and the police) respondents who perceived that malware attacks were a 
serious problem and that DoS attacks were easy to control were significantly more likely 
to report a higher frequency of cooperation.  In relation to the back stage non-
government meta-cluster (e.g. charities, regulatory bodies, forums etc.), respondents 
who perceived DoS attacks as less of a problem, malware attacks as easy to control, and 
insider unauthorised access as difficult to control, were more likely to report higher 
levels of cooperation; although all these associations only approached conventional 
levels of significance.  Finally, in relation to the back stage government meta-cluster (e.g. 
Home Office, Cabinet Office, HMRC etc.) respondents who perceived personal insider 
unauthorised access as easy to control and ID theft as less of a problem were more 
likely to report higher cooperation rates; although both of these association only 
approached conventional levels of significance.   
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Perceptions of Clusters – Holding all other factors constant the perceptions of organisations 
scales were significantly associated with cooperation in all models.  In relation to the 
front line meta-cluster, a positive association emerged between cooperation frequency 
and the front line effectiveness scale; although this association only approached 
conventional levels of significance.  Conversely, the back stage non-government 
importance scale was negatively associated with cooperation with the front line meta-
cluster.  In relation to the non-government meta-cluster, the back stage government 
importance scale was negatively correlated with cooperation, while the reverse was 
observed with the back stage non-government importance scale.  Finally, in relation to 
the government meta-cluster, the back stage non-government effectiveness scale was 
negatively associated with cooperation frequency.   
Controls – Only two control variables emerged as holding significant associations with 
cooperation frequency.   In relation to cooperation with the non-government meta-
cluster, organisations that had been incorporated for longer and had fewer employees 
were more likely to report higher levels of cooperation.  There were no significant 
associations between the control variables and the other meta-clusters. 
Sub-model Analysis – In order to ascertain which sets of variables (perceptions of 
cybercrime and effectiveness and importance scales) were most predictive in relation to 
each model we conducted sub-model analyses.  The adjusted R2 statistic was used to 
evaluate the sub-models xiv .  Independently the set of perceptions of cybercrimes 
predictors accounted for 22 percent (R2.22), 7 percent (R2.07), and 7 percent (R2.07) of 
the variance for front line, back stage government and back stage non-government 
meta-cluster cooperation respectively.  Independently the set of perceptions of 
effectiveness and importance predictors accounted for 15 percent (R2.15), 12 percent 
(R2.12) and 17 percent (R2.17) of the variance for front line, back stage government and 
back stage non-government meta-cluster cooperation respectively.  These results 
indicate that perceptions of cybercrimes are most predictive of cooperation with the 
front line meta-cluster, while perceptions of effectiveness and importance are most 
predictive of cooperation with back stage government and non-government meta-
clustersxv. 
Discussion 
Results from the MDS and regression models provided the first quantitative evidence of 
cooperation in the UK cybersecurity space.  Hypothesis 1 was largely supported by the 
MDS solution.  We postulated that inter-sector cooperation would not be evident based 
on the nascence of new partnership initiatives and that previous research indicated 
tensions between private and public clusters inhibits cooperation (Dunn-Cavelty and 
Suter 2009; Huey et al. 2012; Sulek & Doscher 2011; Wall 2007).   Contrary to our 
hypothesis, inter-sector cooperation was evident in an inner clique, with private finance 
firms emerging proximate to government, police and regulatory body clusters.  
However, in support of our hypothesis private IT, and to a greater extent private other 
clusters were markedly distant from all other sectors.  Furthermore, the charity and local 
government clusters were also isolated, indicating a lack of cooperation with third-sector 
and non-central government nodes.   In explaining these patterns we revisited the 
conceptual work outlined earlier in the paper.  The degree of public – private 
cooperation evident in the inner circle indicates tensions, if they exist between private 
finance and government nodes, do not manifest in a way that stifles frequency of 
cooperation as suggested by Dunn-Cavelty and Suter (2009) and Sulek and Doscher 
(2011).  While the issues of a lack of a clear business case and tensions between 
  
Model 1: front line meta-cluster
Model 2: back stage non-gov.
meta-cluster
Model 3: back stage gov.
meta-cluster
B SE b B SE b B SE b
Perceptions of cybercrime
Problem of malware attacks 0.50 1.70 0.38 * * * 0.23 0.24 0.17 0.12 0.24 0.09
Problem of DoS attacks 20.01 0.22 20.01 20.30 0.21 20.24 * 20.23 0.19 20.18
Problem of hacking 20.08 0.21 20.08 0.15 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.12
Problem of insider unauthorised access 20.19 0.21 20.19 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.02
Problem of personal ID theft 0.20 0.16 0.18 20.13 0.21 20.11 20.26 0.20 20.23 *
Control of malware attacks 0.16 0.19 0.13 20.29 0.20 20.25 * 20.08 0.18 20.06
Control of DoS attacks 20.54 0.19 2 0.41 * * * 0.11 0.21 0.09 20.08 0.20 20.06
Control of hacking 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.07 0.21 0.06 20.02 0.21 20.01
Control of insider unauthorised access 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.26 0.18 0.20 * 20.37 0.18 2 0.28 *
Control of personal ID theft 20.29 0.18 20.26 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.06
Perceptions of clusters
Front line effectiveness scale 0.12 0.08 0.26 * 20.01 0.08 20.01 20.02 0.08 20.04
Back stage gov. effectiveness scale 20.14 0.11 20.21 20.02 0.10 20.03 0.08 0.13 0.12
Back stage non-gov. effectiveness scale 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.03 20.14 0.05 2 0.42 * * *
Front line importance scale 0.10 0.09 0.18 20.11 0.09 20.18 0.01 0.08 0.02
Back stage gov. importance scale 20.20 0.11 2 0.21 * * 20.26 0.11 2 0.27 * * 20.04 0.12 20.04
Back stage non-gov. importance scale 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.17 0.06 0.48 * * * 0.05 0.06 0.14
Controls
No. of employees 0.15 0.12 0.18 20.19 0.13 20.23 * 0.15 0.13 0.18
Age of org. 20.08 0.09 20.13 0.16 0.08 0.27 * * 0.00 0.09 20.01
Personal length of tenure 20.01 0.06 20.02 0.07 0.06 0.11 20.06 0.06 20.09
Constant 22.05 1.70 20.19 1.54 2.47 1.70
Model fit
Sig. 0.000 0.004 0.025
R
2 0.28 0.20 0.14
n 104 104 104
Note: Significant at: *p , 0.10, * *p , 0.05 and * * *p # 0.01
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hierarchical reporting and horizontal information sharing are likely to be evident, they 
are unlikely to create a significant barrier to cooperation between these specific clusters.  
This may be explained by the historic integration of parts of the finance industry in anti-
fraud partnerships that predate the internet.  These existing lines of cooperation may 
have been ‘hi-jacked’ in the cybersecurity effort, ensuring a close tie to government 
organisations such as the Home Office, the Serious Fraud Office, the police and 
regulatory bodies.  Furthermore, as Dupont (2004) indicates, these nodes are most likely 
to display high amounts of social, cultural, economic, political and symbolic capital, 
ossifying their prominent position in the UK cybersecurity network.  Furthermore, the 
history of centralisation in the UK was highlighted as an advantageous feature of the 
cybersecurity network in the qualitative data: 
“The most noteworthy distinction between UK and US law enforcement practice is the far 
greater coherence and centralization/consolidation of functions in the UK.  On e-crime 
reporting, the UK has Action Fraud; the US has IC3, Consumer Sentinel, and independent 
channels into the US Secret Service and Postal Inspectorate, and the pooling of data among 
those disparate sources is highly incomplete and inconsistent.   On e-crime investigation, the 
UK is more centralised also.” 
Law Enforcement 
This resonates with the observation that the privatisation of partnerships is more 
pronounced in the USA than in Britain, and that ‘the centralized administrative powers 
of the British Home Office have allowed it to develop policies with greater speed and 
coherence than has been possible in the USA’ (Garland 2001: 212).   
Despite close cooperative relations, the MDS showed that remaining private clusters, 
especially ‘other’ (which included a large number of SMEs), cooperated much less 
frequently with other clusters, including government and police.  While this pattern 
partly supports the first hypothesis, the issues raised by Dunn-Cavelty and Suter and 
Sulek and Doscher were not indicated as reasons for low levels of cooperation in the 
comments from respondents: 
“There are too many organisations looking at, and dealing with cybercrime - and this only 
provides confusion and uncertainty.  SME outreach has been neglected for well over a 
decade, despite the rhetoric, and there is little follow-up on guidance.  Frankly, I lose 
patience with decision-makers who take years to make decisions. The electronic economy 
requires us to make fast decisions as the law NEVER catches up with reality.” 
Private Sector – Other 
“To be honest it is my view that the majority of UK bodies, in particular law enforcement 
know little of the cybercrime problem. Law enforcement is completely ineffective in this 
sector and there is a lack of any effective regulation. This has resulted in a massive gap 
between central Government policy and most industry sectors.” 
Private Sector – Other 
“[There are] difficulties getting SME's to join and engage as well as our ability to deliver the 
right product to them.” 
Charity 
“[Partnerships] should have a federated structure as particular industry sectors will have 
different needs. [A partnership] needs to link with the very senior level of engagement 
following the recent No. 10 event, otherwise it will become an isolated group of experts 
without the links to achieve outcomes at board level.” 
Government – Non-Criminal Justice 
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“Government agencies should aim to partner with private industry more. But, legislation 
inhibits this.” 
Government – Criminal Justice 
How might we account for the low inter-sector cooperation frequencies of these private 
non-finance nodes?  This might result from a combination of an over-crowded 
cybersecurity space, the criminal justice system’s poor record in apprehending and 
successfully prosecuting cybercrime perpetrators, inhibiting legislation and historically 
poor engagement with SMEs and a poor understanding of their security needs.  
However, it is also likely that SMEs–especially those that have poor cyberthreat 
awareness–find it difficult to justify a business case for cooperation in austere economic 
times.  Private ‘other’ organisations are also likely to have less of the various forms of 
capital outlined by Dupont, inhibiting their desirability as partners in cooperation within 
the UK cybersecurity network.  Maybe the expectation of involvement from SMEs is 
misplaced and so we should not expect an innate drive to want to cooperate.  Perhaps 
then we can learn something from the cooperation initiatives espoused by the Virtual 
Global Taskforce that promotes more realistic views about what each public and private 
node in a network can contribute, and therefore make more efficient capability 
judgements.   
Beyond public-private partnerships, the MDS visualisation also evidenced low levels of 
cooperation with and between charities, professional bodies and local government 
clusters, further supporting the assumption made in the first hypothesis.  Qualitative 
comments from respondents resonated with the distance evident in the visualisation: 
“[A partnership should not be] another old boys network. The e-Crime community already 
suffers from cliques.  Membership should be free and include government, business, 
consumers groups and civil society groups.  There needs to be funding for groups such as 
not-for-profits and academics to attend so that it isn't biased towards large organisations that 
can afford to fund public policy people.” 
Charity 
The exclusion of these clusters from the inner circles of partnership working in 
cybersecurity, especially the charity and not-for-profit cluster, are evident in other areas 
of criminal justice.  Mills et al. (2011) in their study of the role of the third sector in 
work with offenders found that the erosion of the funding ‘security net’ in the form of 
grants from Government had resulted in the exclusion of some charities in partnerships.  
Moreover, they concluded that a substantial gap existed between the Government 
rhetoric surrounding the third sector and the actual partnership opportunities.  Parallels 
between this research and ours are evident, most notably in relation to a lack of funding, 
or as Dupont puts it economic capital, and the impactions this has for participation in 
partnership endeavours.  Attending national meetings, developing and maintaining 
information sharing protocols, and compliance with international cybersecurity 
standards all require resource that many charities and smaller organisations find it 
difficult to justify.  Furthermore, the exclusion (whether active or not) of local 
government, private – other and professional body clusters from partnerships may 
signal that they are perceived to have little to provide cybersecurity networks, whether it 
is technical expertise, or any other form of network capital. Again, the point made above 
in relation to taking a realistic view on possible contributions based on capabilities is 
also important, if not more so in relation to these more isolated nodes. 
Crawford (2002) argues that patterns of inclusion and exclusion are characteristic of 
crime reduction partnership spaces, and are often borne out of contradiction, ambiguity 
and ambivalence.  Comments from respondents showed that while the rhetoric of cyber 
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security was evident from government departments, incongruity and uncertainty around 
the issues were apparent: 
“…In my experience government departments are out of touch, and insufficiently dynamic 
to take a lead in this area…In addition, it is also my experience that there is a lack of co-
ordination between government departments 'rushing' to the 'cyber' threat. For example; 
during a recent conversation with the National Fraud Authority, it was apparent that there 
was insufficient knowledge of what the private sector was doing or even what other 
(government) departments were doing. The idea that central government could lead and co-
ordinate responses ignores the cultural and other limitations of central government.” 
Private Sector - Finance 
“The Home Office has ownership of cyber in formal terms.  However no-one has any real 
oversight or overview of e-issues as a whole, nor any desire for it, as they are trapped in their 
own silos and ambitions.”  
Law Enforcement 
These comments resonate with Edwards and Hughes’ (2009) conclusion that divisions 
exist between security talk, decisions and actions that result in gaps in cooperation and 
security outcomes.  These gaps are both enlarged and contracted by the time-variable 
power-play between the various public, private, law enforcement and voluntary nodes in 
the networks who draw on their various mixtures of network capital.  Furthermore, 
outcomes are sectorially and geographically uneven, furthering political (with a small ‘p’) 
tensions in networks that both open up new opportunities for further cooperation, and 
narrow and close off others.  Ultimately the pluralized cyber security space is shaped by 
contradictory and unstable forces that are endemic to crime reduction partnership 
endeavours (Edwards and Hughes 2009).   
In our second hypothesis we postulated that perceptions of the seriousness of 
cybercrime problems and the difficulty of their control would be significantly associated 
with levels of cooperation, based on the partnership literature that suggests networks of 
security arrange around significant and complex crime problems (Crawford 1997; 
Garland 2001; Hughes 2007).  The regression model results provided limited support 
for this hypothesis, showing that these sets of variables were most significantly 
associated with cooperation with the front-line meta-cluster (private organisations and 
the police), while being weakly associated (only approaching conventional levels of 
significance) with both back stage non-government and government cooperation.  It is 
likely that the strong statistical association between the perception that malware attacks 
were a serious problem and cooperation with the front line can be explained by the link 
between malware attacks and forms of corporate and personal identity 
theft/duplication.  We suggest that those who consider that these particular crimes are 
more/most serious compared to other cybercrimes are more likely to seek cooperation 
with clusters with experience and expertise in the area.  Of course, conversely we can 
argue that it is an artefact of intensification of views resulting from like-minded 
cooperation itself: those who cooperate with these clusters are more likely to think these 
types of cybercrime are more serious (see Williams & Levi 2013).  Unpacking the 
association between the perception that DoS attacks are easy to control and front line 
cooperation is more complex.  As above we could argue that cooperation promotes this 
perception, while still acknowledging that the reverse is also possible (but also counter-
intuitive).  Identifying causality is problematic in cross-sectional quantitative designs and 
further qualitative work is necessary to begin to flesh out these various associations.  
What we can be confident of is that the sub-model analysis shows that perceptions of 
cybercrime are by far the strongest association in relation to front line cooperation, 
when compared to back stage government and non-government cooperation.  This 
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suggests that, if we are to assume perception precedes cooperation, that the complexity 
of cybercrime problems is only significant in motivating cooperation with the front line, 
and as indicated below, not with government or non-government meta-clusters. 
In our final hypothesis we made the assumption that respondents who perceived a 
cluster as effective or important would cooperate frequently with that cluster, based on 
research that shows nodes will seek to cooperate with other nodes who demonstrate 
they can assemble certain forms of network capital to achieve effective outcomes, which 
increases their importance in cybersecurity networks (Nhan and Huey 2008; Huey et al. 
2012; Dupont 2004).  Regression analyses provided evidence to partially support this 
hypothesis, especially in relation to cooperation with back stage non-government.  
However, conversely, in most cases, perceptions that certain clusters of nodes were 
ineffective or not important were associated with cooperation with alternative clusters.  
For example, those that felt that government was unimportant in the fight against 
cybercrime were more likely to cooperate with front line and non-government meta-
clusters.   Furthermore, those perceiving that non-government was ineffective were 
more likely to cooperate with government.   Given that our sub-model analysis revealed 
that perceptions of clusters were most important in predicting cooperation with 
government and non-government meta-clusters (as opposed to perceptions of 
cybercrimes – see previous paragraph), these symmetrical negative perceptions of both 
these clusters are important, as they may indicate that some nodes only exclusively 
cooperate with one or the other type of node in the cybersecurity network.   
Conclusions 
In this paper we have provided evidence showing how multi-agency partnership 
working operates in the cyber security space. Our mapping of the cyber security 
cooperation space utilising MDS revealed that gaps exists in the network.  Qualitative 
comments from the survey of UKIA community respondents allowed us to interpret 
gaps in public-private partnerships in terms of a combination of an over-crowded 
cybersecurity space, the criminal justice system’s poor record in apprehending and 
successfully prosecuting cybercrime perpetrators, inhibiting legislation and historically 
poor engagement with SMEs and a poor understanding of their security needs.  We also 
highlighted the possibility that SMEs with poor cyberthreat awareness may find it 
difficult to justify a business case for spending time and its opportunity cost – money – 
on cooperation in austere economic times.  Furthermore, SMEs are likely to exhibit 
fewer of the various forms of network capital outlined by Dupont, inhibiting their 
desirability as partners in cooperation within the UK cybersecurity network.  Similarly, 
we explained that low levels of network capital, especially a poor partnership funding 
structure, were partly responsible for infrequent communications between non-private-
non-central government organisations, such as charities and local government, and 
central government and private clusters.  Our regression models indicated that various 
characteristics emerged as significantly associated with cooperation.  Perceptions of 
cybercrimes were strongly correlated with cooperation with the front line cluster, while 
perceptions of organisations, in terms of effectiveness and importance, were correlated 
with cooperation with back stage government and non-government clusters.  These 
various associations indicate that there are different motivators and inhibitors for 
cooperation with the various clusters in the cybercrime cooperation network. 
Understanding the origin of these motivations requires further qualitative study.  Our 
data suggest that the neo-liberal rationality that has been evoked in other areas of crime 
control (Edwards and Hughes 2009) is also evident in the control of cybercrimes, where 
state intervention is rolled back (and/or never is rolled out) as private actors adopt 
individualized, responsibilised and practical roles in a networked fashion.  These cyber 
security networks mobilise the diverse specialist resources, beyond those marshalled by 
criminal justice agencies, that are required to mitigate the cybercrime threat.  However, 
! 19!
divisions exist between the High Policing rhetoric of the Cyber Security Strategy 
(Cabinet Office 2011) and the Lower Policing cooperation outputs and outcomes in this 
networked space.  The influence of network capital, especially economic capital, creates 
a power-play between the various public, private, law enforcement and voluntary nodes 
resulting in sectorially and geographically uneven cooperation patterns.  We conclude, 
like Edwards and Hughes (2009), that the pluralized cyber security space is shaped by 
contradictory and unstable forces that are endemic to crime reduction partnership 
endeavours.  A way forward may be to formally acknowledge the limited capabilities and 
interests of some nodes in the cyber security network, therefore reducing expectations 
and opening a space for discussion on compensation for low levels of appropriate 
network capital.  
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i Third or voluntary sector organisations are missing from this list.  Such organisations play a vital role in 
cybercrime reduction partnerships in the UK and have been included in our analysis reported later. 
ii IACG is an initiative within the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Communications–
Electronics Security Group (CESG). 
iii European Network & Information Security Agency 
iv Information Security Forum 
v The Information Security Alliance 
vi The Chartered Institute for IT!
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vii IACG is an initiative within the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Communications–
Electronics Security Group (CESG). See 
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/Publications/Documents/uk_ia_community.pdf 
viii We used the Bristol Online Survey tool: http://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/.  Given this online element the 
fieldwork was conducted in line with the ethical guidelines established by the Association of Internet 
Researchers and the British Society of Criminology. We made efforts to establish informed consent via the 
introduction page to the online survey.  The research aims and objectives were clearly expressed and all 
respondents were informed that the data produced would be anonymised and would remain confidential.  
ix These interviewees were identified from the survey.  We ensured that informed consent was gained at that 
the respondents understood that their data would remain confidential and their identities and organisations 
anonymous.!
!
xi Not presented here due to space restrictions.  Available upon request. 
xii Other standard diagnostics also indicated the factorability of the correaltion matrix.  The Kaiser-Meyer-
Oklin value was .887, exceeding the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser 1974), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
reached statistical significance. 
xiii Cronbach's alpha is commonly used to indirectly indicate the degree to which a set of items measures a 
single underlying latent construct based on an assesssment on the degree of intercorrelations of the set of 
items. Kline (1999) details an anlpha of .70 and above is acceptable for evidencing internal consistency of a set 
of items (i.e. the items are all measuring the same underlying construct).  The Cronbach's alpha reulsts for our 
item scales were: Front line effectiveness scale: Cronbach’s α .70; back stage gov. effectiveness scale: 
Cronbach’s α .84; back stage non-government effectiveness scale: Cronbach’s α .81; Front line importance 
scale: Cronbach’s α .77; back stage gov. effectiveness scale: Cronbach’s α .72; back stage non-government 
effectiveness scale: Cronbach’s α .78.   
xiv  This is a measure of model fit and is the coefficient of determination that indicates how well the model 
predicts the observed data: r .10 is small, r .30 is medium and r .50 is large. The social science standard for a 
‘good’ fit is R2 .30 (Cohen 1988). 
xv Of course the inverse is also possible; that cooperation levels predict perceptions of cybercrimes, 
effectiveness and importance of organisations.  Concluding causality is problematic in cross-sectional designs 
and we can only establish associations with a degree of statistical certainty (Tabachnick and Fidell 2013).!
